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OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                              
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge 
 
 
 Jamar L. Travillion appeals the District Court’s 
dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 
U.S.C. § 2254.  Travillion was convicted in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Allegheny County of robbery in violation 
of 18 Pa. C.S. § 3701(a)(1).  In support of his request for 
habeas relief, Travillion argues, among other things, that his 
constitutional right to due process was violated because the 
evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to support a 
finding that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.   
 
 Because we conclude that the Pennsylvania court’s 
adjudication of petitioner’s insufficient evidence claim 
involved an unreasonable application of clearly established 
federal law enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 
(1979), we reverse the Order of the District Court denying 
habeas relief, and we remand with instructions to grant the 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and issue the writ.      
     
I. 
 At trial, the Commonwealth’s case consisted of the 
testimony of two witnesses: (1) Deborah Lynn Diodati, the 
 
* Participated via video conference. 
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manager of the store that was robbed; and (2) Detective John 
J. Godlewski, a fingerprint expert.    
   
 Ms. Diodati testified that she was the store manager of 
Rainbow Apparel on February 24, 2003.  She arrived for 
work late at 9:30 a.m. because it was “[s]nowing pretty bad” 
and “the roads were pretty bad.”  App. 93.  Although 
company policy prohibited an employee from entering the 
store prior to operating hours without another employee, Ms. 
Diodati decided to enter the store alone because she had just 
spoken to her assistant manager who was not going to arrive 
on time.     
 
 Ms. Diodati unlocked the front door, entered, and 
turned around to lock the door when she noticed someone 
behind her.  She described a person in a winter jacket, who 
carried a Manila folder in his left hand.  She stepped toward 
the door to say the store was not open as the person “reached 
for the door.”  App. 95-96.  The person then “pushed his way 
inside, [and] told [her] numerous times to turn off the alarm.”  
App. 96. 
 
 Ms. Diodati turned off the alarm, and the person 
“grabbed ahold of [her] arm and motioned [her] to walk 
towards the cash wrap,” the place where the cash registers 
and a small safe were located.  App. 97.  Ms. Diodati testified 
that the safe was “underneath the counter inside a door” and 
that “from plain view you wouldn’t be able to see it.”  App. 
99.  The intruder then demanded money from the safe, and 
Ms. Diodati knelt onto the floor.  As the robber knelt on the 
floor beside her, she opened the safe and extracted two 
envelopes, which each contained two to three hundred 
dollars, and handed them to the robber.  She testified as 
follows: 
 
Q. Did you reach down and 
open the lockbox? 
A. Yes, I did.  I was actually 
kneeling on the floor. 
Q. What did he do at that 
point? 
A. He was kneeling on the 
floor beside me. 
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Q. What did you notice? 
A. Well, after I had handed 
him the envelopes with the money 
in it, he set the folder that he had 
had on the floor; and, also, he set 
his gun down, which had been the 
first time I had seen it, in between 
us and reached in to make sure 
there was nothing left in the safe.  
 
App. 99-100.  When the robber stood up, he picked up the 
gun but left the folder on the floor.   
  
 After checking to make sure there was no more money 
left in the safe, the robber grabbed Diodati by her arm, and 
told her they were going to the second safe, which was in her 
office, to get the rest of the money.  Ms. Diodati testified that, 
other than herself, “nobody but my district manager and my 
other assistants knew about” that second safe.  App. 101, 105.  
On the way to the second safe, Ms. Diodati was scared and 
made a comment that she had children, to which she thought 
the robber responded, “I know.”  App. 103.   
 
 In the process of going to the office, the intruder 
“reached up and very forcefully ripped” a sliding “accordion” 
door “almost off the hinges.”  App. 103.  Once in her office, 
Diodati opened the other safe.  She then handed the robber 
two bank deposit bags containing approximately $6,000, 
which the robber placed into a green bag he had strapped over 
his shoulder.  
 
 Ms. Diodati testified that she began to cry, and the 
robber told her he wanted to go out the back door, which led 
to a parking lot and required another alarm to be turned off.  
Diodati unlocked the back door, and the intruder then ran 
from the building across a parking lot to a four-door Ford 
Taurus automobile, which had the motor running.  The robber 
entered the front passenger side of the vehicle, and the driver 
then pulled away.   
 
 Once the robber left, Diodati locked the back door, ran 
to the front of the store, locked the front door, and called the 
police.  While she was talking to the police on the phone, she 
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looked at the floor and saw the folder and papers were still 
there.    
  
 After the police arrived and she was conveying the 
events to them, Diodati pointed out the Manila folder and 
papers.  She was unable to identify Travillion as the robber 
since the robber’s face was covered.  As to a description of 
the robber, she testified: 
 
Q. Now, talking about the 
description of the actor at the time 
this took place, what do you 
remember about the physical 
appearance of the individual that 
robbed you that day? 
A. Probably first and 
foremost, he was very well 
spoken.  Probably about 5’9”, 
5’10”, just judging from his 
height compared to mine.  He had 
a big, bulky jacket on, but I 
assumed – he wasn’t – he was 
probably athletically built, maybe 
like 160 or so. 
Q.  Could you estimate how 
old this individual was? 
A. Probably in his early to 
mid twenties. 
Q. How about ethnicity?  
Anything indicate to you whether 
he might have been African-
American?  Hispanic? 
A. His voice led me to believe 
he could have been African-
American, yes. 
 
App. 112-13.  She also noted that he wore dark pants and a 
big off-white winter coat with fur around the hood, and he 
had a turtle neck pulled up to his nose and a woman’s 
stocking over the top of that, with the hood of his jacket 
pulled down so she “never really saw his face.”  App. 113.  
At trial it was stipulated that the police report at the time of 
arrest reflected that Travillion was 6’1” tall and weighed 170 
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pounds.  He had black, straight and short hair, brown eyes, 
medium complexion, medium frame build, a “U.S. region” 
accent, and a pierced left ear.  App. 152.  
  
 The robbery occurred at 9:30 a.m. on a Monday, and 
Ms. Diodati testified that an armored car would pick up 
money from the store on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, 
normally arriving between 10:15 and 11:30 in the morning.  
Approximately $7,000 was stolen that day.   
 
 Detective Godlewski testified that he processed for 
fingerprints on the counter, the sliding accordion door that the 
robber tore partially off its hinges, and several other areas.  
The Manila folder with some papers inside it, identified by 
the detective as “some type of math [or] geometry papers” 
left behind by the intruder were also processed for latent 
prints.  App. 134, 136.  The detective also took “two scaled 
photographs of shoe impressions out the back door in the 
snow behind the business.”  App. 132.  The detective testified 
that he never received any shoes to make a comparison to the 
photographs he had taken at the scene.  
  
 The police were able to obtain two left thumbprints, a 
left ring finger print, and a left middle finger print on the 
Manila folder, and one left thumbprint on one of the papers 
that had been inside the folder.  After submitting these 
fingerprints for comparison, it was determined that they 
belonged to Travillion.    
  
 Detective Godlewski testified there were no other 
prints of value recovered on the items.  With regard to the 
door that was torn from its hinges, Detective Godlewski 
testified that although a latent fingerprint of value was 
retrieved, it was determined to not be that of Travillion, and 
the detective did not identify the person to whom the print 
belonged.  The only fingerprints identified as belonging to 
Travillion were those on the Manila folder and one of the 
papers carried into the scene by the robber.  The detective 
further testified that people can touch things without leaving a 
fingerprint, and that it was possible that someone other than 
Travillion touched the Manila folder but did not leave 





 On December 21, 2006, a jury found Travillion guilty 
of the robbery.  On January 3, 2007, Travillion was sentenced 
to a mandatory 10 to 20 years in prison, to run consecutively 
to the separate sentence of life without the possibility of 
parole that he was serving at the time as a result of a separate 
conviction for second-degree murder on February 21, 2006.  
Travillion filed a post-sentence motion in the trial court 
asserting that the evidence was insufficient to support his 
conviction in violation of his constitutional right to due 
process.  That motion was denied by operation of law on 
August 29, 2007.   
 
 On direct appeal to the Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania, Travillion raised his sufficiency of the 
evidence claim.  The Superior Court affirmed the judgment of 
sentence by Order and Memorandum of November 5, 2008.  
Travillion’s application for reargument before the Superior 
Court en banc was denied on January 12, 2009.  In February 
of 2009, he filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal in 
Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court, which was denied on July 7, 
2009.  Travillion did not seek certiorari with the United 
States Supreme Court. 
 
 On May 21, 2010, Travillion filed a pro se petition for 
relief under Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act 
(“PCRA”).  Subsequently-appointed counsel filed a motion 
for leave to withdraw and a no-merit brief in support of the 
motion.  On August 19, 2013, the PCRA Court dismissed the 
PCRA petition without a hearing.   
 
 Travillion filed a pro se appeal in the Superior Court, 
and the Superior Court affirmed the denial of his PCRA 
petition on February 10, 2015.  He did not seek allowance of 
appeal to Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court.  
 
 On June 2, 2015, Travillion filed a pro se habeas 
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District 
Court.  On July 17, 2017, a Magistrate Judge issued a Report 
and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending dismissal of 
the petition.  With regard to the insufficient evidence claim, 
the R&R pointed to the testimony that the robber carried the 
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Manila folder with his left hand into the store and that 
Travillion’s fingerprints from the left hand matched those 
found on the folder and paper.  On January 19, 2018, the 
District Court adopted the R&R as the Opinion of the Court, 
dismissed the habeas petition, and denied a certificate of 
appealability (“COA”).     
 
 On appeal, our Court granted Travillion’s request for a 
COA on his claims that there was insufficient evidence to 
support his conviction and that his rights under the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment were 
violated.1  In granting the COA, with respect to the 
insufficient evidence claim, the COA Order cited United 
States v. Strayhorn, 743 F.3d 917, 922-23 (4th Cir. 2014), and 
Mikes v. Borg, 947 F.2d 353, 357 (9th Cir. 1991), in support 
thereof. 
   
III. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over the habeas 
petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  Our review 
of the District Court’s decision is plenary.  See Showers v. 
Beard, 635 F.3d 625, 628 (3d Cir. 2011).  Thus, we review 
the Pennsylvania court’s adjudication of the merits of the 
insufficient evidence claim on Travillion’s direct appeal 
under the same standard that the District Court was required 
to apply, namely, the standard provided in the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).2  
    
 
1 Travillion raises his Confrontation Clause claim on appeal, 
in the alternative.  See Appellant’s Br. 64.  Because we agree 
that habeas relief is warranted based on his insufficient 
evidence claim, we need not reach his Confrontation Clause 
claim.   
   
2 With regard to his claim of insufficient evidence, it is 
undisputed that Travillion has satisfied the exhaustion 
requirement for habeas petitions under § 2254 and that the 
Pennsylvania courts adjudicated the merits of this claim on 





   Pursuant to AEDPA, 
An application for a writ of 
habeas corpus on behalf of a 
person in custody pursuant to the 
judgment of a State court shall not 
be granted with respect to any 
claim that was adjudicated on the 
merits in State court proceedings 
unless the adjudication of the 
claim – 
 
(1) resulted in a decision that 
was contrary to, or involved      
an unreasonable application of,                                                
clearly established Federal law, 
as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States; or 
 
(2) resulted in a decision that 
was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in 
light of the evidence presented 
in the State court proceeding. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  Here, Travillion argues the 
Pennsylvania court’s denial of his insufficient evidence claim 
resulted in a decision that “involved an unreasonable 
application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”  See 
id.3  He further argues that the Pennsylvania court’s decision 
 
3 There is no dispute that the Superior Court applied 
Pennsylvania’s equivalent of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Jackson v. Virginia standard to Travillion’s insufficiency of 
the evidence claim.  See Eley v. Erickson, 712 F.3d 837, 848 
(3d Cir. 2013) (holding that Pennsylvania’s test for 
insufficient evidence “do[es] not contradict Jackson”); Evans 
v. Ct. of Common Pleas, Del. Cty., 959 F.2d 1227, 1232 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (“the test for insufficiency of the evidence is the 
same under both Pennsylvania and federal law”).    
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was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, in 
light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.   
   
 Under § 2254(d)(1), “[a] state court decision is an 
unreasonable application . . . if the court identifies the correct 
governing legal rule from the Supreme Court’s cases but 
unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case.”  
Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 100 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  “[T]he state court’s application of 
clearly established law must be objectively unreasonable 
before a federal court may grant the writ.”  Rountree v. 
Balicki, 640 F.3d 530, 537 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  In determining whether a state court’s 
application of clearly established Supreme Court law is 
objectively reasonable, we may consider the reasoning of 
federal courts below the level of the Supreme Court.  
Marshall v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 71 n.24 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(“We have concluded . . . that decisions of federal courts 
below the level of the United States Supreme Court may be 
helpful to us in ascertaining the reasonableness of state 
courts’ application of clearly established United States 
Supreme Court precedent, as well as helpful amplifications of 
that precedent”) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
   
V.  
 When a petitioner alleges entitlement to habeas relief 
by challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 
state court conviction, as Travillion does, the clearly 
established federal law governing the insufficient evidence 
claim is the standard set out by the Supreme Court in Jackson 
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).  See, e.g., Eley, 712 F.3d at 
847 (“The clearly established federal law governing Eley’s 
[insufficient evidence] claim was determined in Jackson”).  
Under Jackson, “the relevant question is whether, after 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (citing Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 
U.S. 356, 362 (1972)).   
 
 This reasonable doubt standard of proof requires the 
finder of fact “to reach a subjective state of near certitude of 
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the guilt of the accused.”  Id. at 315 (citing In re Winship, 397 
U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)) (emph. added).  
It “‘plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal 
procedure,’ because it operates to give ‘concrete substance’ to 
the presumption of innocence to ensure against unjust 
convictions, and to reduce the risk of factual error in a 
criminal proceeding.”  Id. (quoting Winship, 397 U.S. at 363).  
A conviction that fails to satisfy the Jackson standard violates 
due process, see Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, and thus a 
convicted habeas petitioner is entitled to relief if the state 
court’s adjudication denying the insufficient evidence claim 
was objectively unreasonable, see Parker v. Matthews, 567 
U.S. 37, 43 (2012).           
 
 In this case, there is no dispute that the relevant 
Pennsylvania statute for robbery was violated.  The question 
on appeal is whether there was sufficient evidence for a 
rational trier of fact to identify Travillion as the perpetrator of 
the robbery, in other words, placing him at the scene of the 
crime during the robbery, beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
ultimately, whether the Pennsylvania court’s denial of relief 
on Travillion’s direct appeal was objectively unreasonable, in 
light of the evidence in this case.  
    
 In the last reasoned Pennsylvania court decision 
adjudicating the merits of Travillion’s insufficient evidence 
claim, the Superior Court concluded that the fingerprints on 
the Manila folder and paper left at the crime scene were 
sufficient to prove Travillion’s identity as the robber.  In 
support of this conclusion, the Superior Court stated: “Diodati 
testified that the envelope was in the left hand of the robber 
and, thus, not in common usage.  Furthermore, the 
Commonwealth proved that the fingerprints came from the 
left hand of Travillion.”  App. 293.   
 
 In Mikes v. Borg, 947 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1991), a pre-
AEDPA habeas case, a state prisoner convicted of first degree 
murder appealed the District Court’s Order dismissing his § 
2254 petition.  Id. at 355.  The prosecution’s case against 
Mikes rested upon the fact that his fingerprints were found in 
the victim’s non-public basement on three chrome posts from 
a disassembled turnstile found near the victim’s body, 
including the post identified as the murder weapon.  Id.  Thus, 
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the prosecution’s case rested on the theory that Mikes’ 
fingerprints were impressed on these objects during the 
commission of the crime.  Id. at 356.  Although other prints 
were on the posts and throughout the crime scene, none of the 
fingerprints found anywhere at the crime scene except on the 
posts was identified as Mikes’.  Id. at 356.   
 
 The Ninth Circuit in Mikes pointed out, “In order to 
support a finding that Mikes is guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the record must demonstrate that he in fact touched the 
posts at the time the crime was committed and not at some 
earlier point.”  Id. at 359 (emph. added).  The Court further 
stated, “In cases such as [this], there must, at the very least, 
be sufficient evidence in the record to determine when the 
fingerprints were impressed; otherwise, any conviction would 
be based on pure speculation.”  Id. at 357.  The Court noted 
the lack of evidence as to the age of the fingerprints found on 
the posts and the defense expert’s testimony that fingerprints 
can last indefinitely, which the Ninth Circuit noted is 
“consistent with the testimony of government experts in other 
cases.”  Id. at 358 (citing cases of other Circuits).  “Under our 
judicial system, the defendant has no duty to explain the 
presence of his fingerprints.”  Id. at 359. 
 
 Holding that Mikes’ conviction failed to meet the 
Jackson standard, the Ninth Circuit granted habeas relief, 
recognizing that “to allow this conviction to stand would be 
to hold that anyone who touches anything which is found 
later at the scene of a crime may be convicted.”  Id. at 361 
(quoting Borum v. United States, 380 F.2d 595, 597 (D.C. 
Cir. 1967)).  The Court concluded that “[a]ny determination 
that Mikes’ fingerprints were left on the posts during the 
commission of the offense is unreasonably speculative.”  Id.   
 
 In United States v. Strayhorn, 743 F.3d 917 (4th Cir. 
2014), two defendants allegedly robbed a store at gunpoint 
and bound the store’s owner with duct tape.  Id. at 920.  
However, the prosecution’s fingerprint expert witness 
“conceded that he had no way to determine when [the 
defendant’s] fingerprint was imprinted on the tape.”  Id. at 
923.  On the defendant’s direct appeal, in applying the 
Jackson standard, the Fourth Circuit held that a defendant’s 
fingerprint found on duct tape used to bind a robbery victim 
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was insufficient to support his conviction for robbery where 
the expert could not determine when the print had been 
imprinted on the tape.  Id.   
 
 The Court concluded that “in challenges to convictions 
involving fingerprints on movable objects, in the absence of 
evidence regarding when the fingerprints are made, the 
[prosecution] must marshal sufficient additional incriminating 
evidence so as to allow a rational juror to find guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 923.  “Although the [prosecution] 
may meet this burden with circumstantial evidence, the 
evidence must be sufficiently incriminating to support the 
conviction.”  Id. 
 
 In Travillion’s case, “Appellees acknowledge that the 
crux of the Commonwealth’s case against [Travillion] was 
the fingerprint evidence.”  See Appellees’ Br. 32.  They also 
acknowledge that Ms. Diodati’s physical description of the 
perpetrator did not match Travillion’s characteristics, but they 
argue it was at least close enough not to exclude him.  So 
essentially the only evidence linking Travillion to the crime 
was the fingerprint evidence on the Manila folder and paper, 
plus the fact that Travillion’s characteristics were, at best, 
close enough to the witness’ description of the robber not to 
exclude him.  That is not enough to reasonably conclude that 
the Jackson test was satisfied here.  Evidence that Travillion’s 
fingerprints were found on the easily movable Manila folder 
and a paper inside the folder carried into the store by the 
robber and a witness’ description of the robber that does not 
match Travillion but doesn’t necessarily exclude him is not 
sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to place 
Travillion at the scene of the crime at the time the crime was 
committed beyond a reasonable doubt.     
  
 Applying the Supreme Court’s Jackson standard, in 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, and drawing all reasonable inferences from the 
evidence, no rational trier of fact could have found Travillion 
was the perpetrator of the crime for which he was convicted 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.  
Further, we conclude that the Pennsylvania court’s decision 
denying Travillion’s insufficient evidence claim was an 
objectively unreasonable application of Pennsylvania’s 
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equivalent of the Supreme Court’s Jackson standard.  See 
Jacobs, 395 F.3d at 100; see also White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 
415, 426 (2014) (“a state-court decision is an unreasonable 
application of our clearly established precedent if it correctly 
identifies the governing legal rule (here, Jackson) but applies 
that rule unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner’s 
case”) (parenthetical added).  In coming to these conclusions, 
we are mindful, as Jackson instructs, that “a federal habeas 
court must consider not whether there was any evidence to 
support a state-court conviction, but whether there was 
sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of the facts to find 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Jackson, 443 U.S. at 312-
13.    
 
 Travillion’s fingerprints were only found on easily 
movable objects, i.e., the Manila folder and the paper, and 
there was no evidence of his prints anywhere else at the crime 
scene.  There was no evidence that the folder and paper were 
unavailable to Travillion prior to the robbery, no evidence as 
to the age of the prints, and no evidence as to how long the 
prints could remain on the folder and paper after their 
impression.  Appellees acknowledge that the fingerprint 
expert was unable to say when the prints were placed on the 
folder and paper. 4     
 
4 The Pennsylvania Superior Court and the District Court 
cited Commonwealth v. Hunter, 338 A.2d 623, 624 (Pa. 
Super. 1975), and Commonwealth v. Cichy, 323 A.2d 817, 
818 (Pa. Super. 1974), which predate Jackson, in support of 
the denial of Travillion’s insufficient evidence claim.  In 
Hunter, a burglar entered a building through a broken 
window, ten feet off the ground, that had been covered with 
sheet metal a week prior to the burglary because of a broken 
pane of glass.  Hunter, 338 A.2d at 624.  The defendant’s 
fingerprint was found on the metal, and an expert testified 
that the print was no more than two weeks old.  Id.  The 
defendant had been in the building within that time period 
asking about a job, so theoretically, he could have left the 
print then.  Id.  The Court concluded, however, that the 
possibility that the defendant touched the sheet metal ten feet 
off the ground during that visit was “extremely remote.”  Id.  
Therefore, the fingerprint was sufficient evidence to convict.  




 In addition to the absence of evidence regarding when 
Travillion’s fingerprints on the easily movable folder and 
paper were impressed, there was a lack of sufficient 
additional incriminating evidence, circumstantial or 
otherwise, so as to allow a rational juror to find guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Although there is evidence that Travillion 
touched the folder at some indefinite time with his left hand, 
and there is evidence that the robber carried the folder at the 
time of the crime in his left hand, there is not sufficiently 
incriminating evidence that Travillion was the perpetrator 
holding the folder at the time of the crime.   
 
 Ms. Diodati’s description of the offender, at best, 
merely does not exclude Travillion as the perpetrator.  
Among other things, Diodati testified that she never saw the 
robber’s face, and when asked if “[a]nything indicate[d] to 
[her] whether he might have been African-American? [or] 
Hispanic?,” she replied, “His voice led me to believe he could 
have been African-American.”  App. 112-13 (emph. added).  
It is undisputed that Travillion was actually three to four 
inches taller than the offender described by the witness.  The 
general description given by the witness in this case was 
insufficient additional incriminating evidence for any rational 
 
found on a package of cigarettes on the floor in a burglarized 
gas station, and the fingerprint expert did not offer an opinion 
as to when the print was impressed.  Cichy, 323 A.2d at 818, 
819.  The Superior Court reversed the conviction, holding that 
“if the prints are discovered on an object that is readily 
[m]ovable and [i]n common usage, the possibility of innocent 
contact is too great to sustain a conviction on that evidence 
alone.”  Id. at 819.  Here, the fingerprints used to convict 
Travillion are unlike the fingerprints in Hunter, which were 
left on a relatively immovable object in a relatively 
inaccessible spot within two weeks of the robbery.  And the 
fingerprints used to convict Travillion share some of the same 
weaknesses as those in Cichy (as well as Mikes and 
Strayhorn): the evidence could not reasonably support a 
finding that the prints were impressed during the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Thus, unlike in Hunter, and like 
in Cichy, the fingerprints are insufficient to support the 
conviction under Jackson.           
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trier of fact to find Travillion guilty of being the robber 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
 The witness’ testimony also revealed the robber had 
knowledge about the store unknown to the general public, 
including, among other things, the store’s layout and inner 
offices, the existence and location of a second safe known 
only to store management and assistants, and (possibly) that 
the witness had children.  The timing of the robbery also 
suggests the robber knew when a large amount of cash would 
be present before the armored car pickup.  There was no 
evidence, however, that Travillion was privy to any of this 
information.   
 
 There was no evidence connecting Travillion to the 
robbery, such as evidence he owned clothing worn by the 
intruder, or that he owned a bag similar to the one used during 
the crime, or that he had any connection to the getaway 
vehicle, or possessed any of the robbery’s proceeds.  There 
was also no evidence of any attempt to match the 
photographed shoeprint at the crime scene with shoes owned 
by Travillion, or even his shoe size. 
 
 Ms. Diodati’s testimony included that she observed the 
robber holding the folder in his left hand, setting the folder on 
the floor beside her, grabbing her arm multiple times, setting 
his gun on the floor beside her, reaching into a safe, picking 
up his gun, “very forcefully ripp[ing]” a sliding door “almost 
off the hinges,” and she handed the robber the contents of 
each of the two safes and watched him place the deposit bags 
into his green shoulder bag.  Ms. Diodati further testified that 
on the morning of a “pretty bad” snow storm, the intruder was 
wearing a “big, bulky” winter coat with fur around the hood, 
a turtle neck pulled up to his nose, and had the hood of his 
coat pulled down.    
 
 Thus, the witness’ testimony included numerous 
detailed observations involving the robber’s hands, as well as 
testimony that the robber was wearing winter clothes on the 
morning of a significant snow storm in addition to wearing a 
stocking over his head to hide his identity.  However, despite 
the obvious significance of needing to prove that the 
fingerprints on the easily movable items were impressed by 
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Travillion during the commission of the crime, the 
prosecution elicited no testimony that Diodati ever saw the 
robber’s bare hand or that the intruder was not wearing 
gloves, let alone that she saw him holding the folder or paper 
with his bare hand.   
  
 We conclude that it was objectively unreasonable for 
the Pennsylvania court to decide that, after viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a 
rational juror could have found Travillion guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  In particular, under the circumstances in 
this case, it was objectively unreasonable to apply the 
Jackson standard and deny relief on Travillion’s claim that 
there was insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that 
Travillion was the robber that carried the folder and paper 
during the commission of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Any determination that Travillion’s fingerprints were 
left on the folder and paper during the commission of the 
offense is unreasonably speculative.5    
      
VI. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Order of the 
District Court denying habeas relief and remand for the 
District Court to issue the writ in connection with his robbery 
conviction, with prejudice to re-prosecution.  See, e.g., 
O’Laughlin v. O’Brien, 568 F.3d 287, 309 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978)) 
(“Because double jeopardy principles apply here, we remand 
to the district court to order O’Laughlin’s unconditional 
release with prejudice to reprosecution.”); see Burks, 437 
U.S. at 18 (“Since we hold today that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause precludes a second trial once the reviewing court has 
found the evidence legally insufficient, the only just remedy 
available for that court is the direction of a judgment of 
acquittal.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
5 Having found habeas relief is warranted because the State 
court’s adjudication of Travillion’s insufficient evidence 
claim involved an unreasonable application of clearly 
established law set out by the Supreme Court in Jackson, we 
need not reach Travillion’s remaining claims in support of his 
request for habeas relief.   
